You have full access to this open access article. This paper questions this claim through a case study of such activism in Singapore. Rent-seeking behaviour, which involves using resources to obtain transfers without contributing to production, is an example of unproductive entrepreneurship. It also violates the democratic commitment to equality before the law and may even undermine the rule of law itself Holcombe and Castillo ; Holcombe Political economists generally acknowledge that the problem of containing unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship is an institutional one.
This paper draws on a detailed case study of the Singaporean experience to throw light on these perspectives and specifically to question the claims of embedded autonomy put forward by developmental state theorists.
Presently, it collaborates with private start-ups and invests in future-oriented projects to foster an innovation ecosystem Woo Singapore is thus both a developmental and an entrepreneurial state Chang a ; Ebner ; Kattel et al.
Many also highlight its record in sustaining low levels of corruption and hence its apparent ability to engage in state intervention without interest group capture. It thus provides an important testing ground to evaluate the claim that developmental states control rent-seeking.
Footnote 1. In contrast to the developmental state narrative, the paper identifies three causal mechanisms through which rent-seeking behaviour is encouraged in Singapore. First, the Singaporean state provides grants to local enterprises on very generous terms, thus creating an attractive target for subsidy entrepreneurs.
