Original article can be found here. On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine. As of the time of writing week beginning 28th February hostilities are continuing between Russian and Ukrainian forces.
This is in addition to the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, the doctrine stresses electronically attacking hostile airborne radars. The latter are targeted by jammers covering frequency bands of one gigahertz up to 18GHz. Jamming airborne radars is an important part of Russian EW doctrine. Military aircraft use X-band radars 8. These radars provide fire control for air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. Russian Army logic is to protect deployments and targets on the ground by jamming airborne radars to deprive military aircraft of fire control information.
Beyond airborne radars, Russian Army EW doctrine prioritises detecting and jamming enemy military radios. Russian Army EW strives to attack hostile military radio networks to deprive the enemy of C2 and situational awareness. The desired result is for enemy C2 to become badly coordinated, if not impossible. If enemy radio networks are attacked, hostile unit commanders cannot share their situation with higher echelons. Headquarters are thus deprived a reliable, real-time picture of what is happening in the battle.
Attacking these networks has a secondary but equally important benefit. It makes it difficult for commanders to distribute orders to subordinate units based on the prevailing situation. To summarise, land EW prevents enemy commanders from accurately reading the battle and responding accordingly.
Like all land forces, the Russian Army uses its EW systems to detect and intercept hostile radio transmissions so they can be exploited for intelligence. Every land forces unit from an infantry squad upwards uses radios.
